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29 
WHY IMMIGRATION’S PLENARY POWER 
DOCTRINE ENDURES 
DAVID A. MARTIN* 
Abstract 
The plenary power doctrine, traditionally traced to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chae Chan Ping, has persisted despite a steady and vigorous 
stream of scholarly criticism.  This essay undertakes to explain why.  First, 
the Court’s strong deference to the political branches does not derive from 
the concept of sovereignty.  Justice Field’s opinion for the Court invoked 
sovereignty not to trump rights claims but to solve a federalism problem — 
structural reasoning that locates the immigration control power squarely in 
the federal government, though not explicitly enumerated in the 
Constitution. The Chae Chan Ping Court’s deference to the political 
branches instead rested primarily on the close linkage between foreign 
affairs and immigration control decisions. The essay illustrates why such 
linkage is more significant than is often appreciated, even today, as the 
federal government seeks to work in a complex and uncertain global 
context, where many powers taken for granted in the domestic arena simply 
are not reliably available.  The Court implicitly remains willing to give the 
political branches leeway to use immigration authorities in rough-hewn 
ways, even though deference does mean that some governmental acts 
deriving from illicit motives rather than genuine foreign affairs 
considerations may go unremedied in court.  The Court adheres to a strong 
deference doctrine because it is concerned that lower courts, if given wider 
authority to review, will overvalue individual interests and undervalue 
governmental interests. In an increasingly dangerous world, the Supreme 
Court is unlikely to overrule the plenary power doctrine.  Academics and 
activists should respond by focusing more attention on rigorous policy 
analysis coupled with advocacy addressed to the political branches — a 
forum where constitutional values can be pursued and successfully, though 
unevenly, vindicated, as Justice Field recognized.  
                                                                                                                 
 * Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor of International Law and Joel B. Piassick 
Research Professor, University of Virginia. The author served, during leave from his 
university position, as General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from 
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Chae Chan Ping v. United States,1 also known as The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, is traditionally taken as the fountainhead of the plenary power 
doctrine. Both the case and the doctrine have been widely and persistently 
condemned in the scholarly literature.2 It almost seems an obligatory rite of 
passage for scholars embarking on the study of immigration law to provide 
their own critique of plenary power or related doctrines of deference.3 
To be sure, there are many reasons for twenty-first-century observers to 
be deeply troubled by Chae Chan Ping.  The 1888 law it sustained stemmed 
from xenophobic and racist agitation in California, scapegoating the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 2. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 12-14, 151-96 (2002); STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 
177-218 (1987); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 124-34 (2002); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 378-90 (2004); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States 
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858-
63 (1987); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Nativism, Terrorism, and Human Rights—
The Global Wrongs of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 31 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521, 538-46 (2000); Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to 
Family Unity: Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of 
Plenary Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 733-38 (1996); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 255, 255-57; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: 
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 
(1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-54  (1990); 
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Plenary 
Power" Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 13 (2003); 
John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the 
McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1499-1504 (1988); Michael Scaperlanda, 
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 1022-31; Margaret H. Taylor, 
Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the 
Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1127-29 (1995). Some find that 
plenary power doctrine is waning. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of 
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-54 (1984); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of 
Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 345-55 (2002). 
 3. My own young-scholar contribution to this genre focused not on Chae Chan Ping’s 
plenary power doctrine, but rather on its procedural cousin, the doctrine deriving from 
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950), which largely 
bars the courts from entertaining procedural due process claims in exclusion cases. David A. 
Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and 
Beyond, 44 PITTS. L. REV. 165 (1983). 
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Chinese in the midst of a severe economic recession.4 And Chae Chan Ping 
himself is a highly sympathetic petitioner. He had lawfully resided in the 
United States for fifteen years, journeying back to visit family in China 
only after carefully obtaining the official certificate provided by law as the 
means for his readmission.5 He was already at sea on his return voyage 
when Congress changed the law, with immediate effect, nullifying the use 
of those certificates to gain reentry.6 Hence his exclusion and his habeas 
corpus challenge.7  
Nonetheless, the case receives more blame than it deserves. For example, 
the Court’s invocation of sovereignty in Chae Chan Ping is sometimes seen 
as an illegitimate judicial move meant to introduce a factor that will trump 
rights claims.8 The Court invoked sovereignty, however, not to deny rights 
but instead primarily to answer a federalism question. It used the concept to 
establish, through structural reasoning, that the federal government in fact 
does possess the authority to regulate migration, even though such a power 
is not enumerated in the Constitution. Furthermore, though the plenary 
power doctrine forecloses most direct constitutional challenges against 
congressional immigration statutes, it is hardly the blank check for the 
executive that is sometimes suggested. Significant statute-based challenges 
to executive action remain available, as do procedural due process 
challenges, at least to deportation proceedings.9 
Offered here is an exploration of the reasons given in Chae Chan Ping 
and the kindred case of Fong Yue Ting10 for deference to the political 
branches. (Decided four years later, Fong Yue Ting extended the Court’s 
deferential stance beyond exclusion at the border to give Congress wide 
authority in setting and changing substantive standards governing 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15-26 (2006). 
 5. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of the 
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 11-13 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 
2005). 
 8. See, e.g., Hernández-Truyol, supra note 2, at 539 (“Flowing from this notion [of 
sovereignty] is the principle that the federal government has preemptive, unfettered 
regulatory power over the exclusion of others or outsiders . . . .”); Saito, supra note 2, at 33 
(“[T]he Supreme Court's justification for the exercise of plenary power is that the power is 
inherent in sovereignty.”).   
 9. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
 10. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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deportation, even of long-time settled residents.11) I go on to consider why 
the plenary power doctrine nonetheless endures, despite the scholarly 
condemnation and the proffered alternatives, even as the Supreme Court 
has assumed a far more assertive role in rights protection in other domains. 
Ultimately, the reasons for the doctrine’s survival are likely to gain in 
strength over coming decades, in a world facing new and more challenging 
forms of violence and conflict, a growing number of weak or failing states, 
a possible increase in virulently contagious diseases, and more severe 
migration pressures.  
In that light, I conclude by suggesting a few lessons about the scholarly 
reaction. The litigation picture is not so bleak as often portrayed. 
Subconstitutional litigation is plentiful, with a significant success rate for 
challengers and a de facto sparsity of judicial deference to the government, 
though the Supreme Court occasionally reaches down to curb a few of the 
more ambitious judicial interventions.12 Moreover, even though bold 
constitutional reforms through the judicial branch are not in the offing, 
constitutional values can be invoked in other ways besides litigation — and 
in fact have been invoked over the past fifty years to win highly significant 
changes in immigration laws through the political process. We scholars 
need to focus on expanding our toolbox and improving the ways we train 
our students to use methods other than constitutional litigation, particularly 
rigorous policy analysis attuned to the true complexity of migration 
management and the political constraints. We should also foster a realistic 
perspective on the high level of immigration opportunity and noncitizen 
protection that mark our overall system — especially when viewed against 
the backdrop of global practices — even while working to improve those 
features.  
I. The Deployment of Sovereignty 
A. Immigration Control: A Structural Feature of Sovereign Nationhood  
Much of the scholarly criticism focuses on the invocation of sovereignty 
in Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, blaming that analytical move for 
the decisions’ broad deference to the political branches and the later 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. at 713-15, 728-29. 
 12. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam); I.N.S. v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 
U.S. 471 (1999).   
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development of immigration exceptionalism.13 But if we take a closer look, 
we find the Court did not deploy sovereignty as a basis for denying rights; 
instead, it used the concept primarily to solve a federalism problem. 
Justice Stephen Field, author of the unanimous decision in Chae Chan 
Ping, first examined the petitioner’s claim that he should be admitted 
because the 1888 Chinese Exclusion Act violated an 1880 treaty with 
China.14 Clearly the statute did violate the treaty, but Field, in his first 
reference to sovereignty, wrote that treaties and statutes are of equal rank, 
and in the case of a conflict, “the last expression of the sovereign will must 
control.”15 This is a logical reading of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI 
of the Constitution, which places treaties and statutes on an equal plane as 
supreme law of the land. And by 1889, the Court had already so ruled in 
other cases.16 Any particular decision to breach a treaty is of course fair 
game for policy objection, even condemnation. But it remains a necessary 
part of international practice that a nation’s leadership retain the power to 
breach a treaty. Most compellingly, in our underdeveloped and 
decentralized international legal system, the primary enforcement tool 
available to address another party’s own treaty violations is a responsive 
breach by the wronged party.17 Objection to any treaty breach, the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. On immigration exceptionalism, see, e.g., 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 9, 34 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, 
and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392-94 (1999). 
 14. 130 U.S. at 596-601. 
 15. Id. at 600.  
 16. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases (Edye v. 
Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884). 
 17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, January 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 335 
(1986); JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 391-92 
(8th ed. 2012). The terminology generally used in these sources speaks of treaty termination 
or suspension in response to a material breach, but this is simply diplomatic terminology for 
what is in reality a responsive breach. Justice Field also emphasized this feature in Chae 
Chan Ping: 
It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the government will 
lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country; but that 
circumstances may arise which would not only justify the government in 
disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it 
should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a 
change in the policy of the country. Neglect or violation of stipulations on the 
part of the other contracting party may require corresponding action on our 
part. When a reciprocal engagement is not carried out by one of the contracting 
parties, the other may also decline to keep the corresponding engagement.  
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insists, must be lodged in other forums, via diplomacy or domestic political 
action, and in either case be addressed to the political branches.18 This 
initial part of the opinion, ratifying Congress’s authority to violate treaties, 
actually tells us little about the concept of sovereignty.  
The next section of the opinion, however, is where that concept draws 
primary attention. Beyond the treaty claim, Justice Field took the petitioner 
to be asserting that there were “other ground[s]” placing the Chinese 
Exclusion Act “beyond the competency of Congress to pass it.”19 The 
challenge is not framed in exactly this manner, but it basically poses a 
federalism issue. Under our constitutional system, it is the states, not the 
federal government, that possess residual general powers, commonly called 
police powers. The federal government is conventionally understood to 
possess only those powers enumerated in the Constitution. By what 
authority, then, does the federal government assert the power to block 
certain foreigners from entering the country?20 The closest enumerated 
power would seem to be Congress’s authority to adopt “an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”21 But naturalization is not the same thing as admission to 
the territory, and the Naturalization Clause has never seemed fully up to the 
task of supporting the complicated superstructure of federal immigration 
controls erected since the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Acts.   
                                                                                                                 
130 U.S. at 600-01. 
 18. 130 U.S. at 602-03. 
 19. Id. at 603.  
 20. The question could be taken as the same one with which Justice Sutherland 
struggled fifty years later, first in a lecture at Columbia Law School, but more famously in 
his majority opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 
(1946). He answered it by propounding an eccentric but elaborate sovereignty transmission 
theory. For analysis and critique of Sutherland’s doctrine, see, e.g., Charles A. Lofgren, 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1 (1973); Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379 (2000). Field’s mode of overcoming the conceptual difficulty 
posed by the sparse list of foreign-affairs powers in the text of the Constitution is far more 
successful and convincing than Sutherland’s.  
The Supreme Court recently resolved a narrow question regarding the derivation and 
allocation of certain foreign affairs authorities. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 
S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding that the President’s authority to recognize other 
governments is exclusive, and that a congressional statute mandating certain statements on a 
U.S. citizen’s passport was therefore unconstitutional). But broader issues about how to 
construe the Constitution’s parsimonious language on foreign affairs powers remain 
unresolved. Compare id. at 2076-96 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion), with id. at 2096-2113 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and id. at 2113-16 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting), and id. at 2116-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/4
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We might first note that this type of challenge to congressional power 
was something of a dangerous argument for the Chinese community to 
propound in 1889.22 To prove that the federal government lacks the 
authority to control migration would not have spelled the end of U.S. 
migration controls. It would instead almost surely have meant that such 
power belongs to the states as part of their general police powers. As of 
1889, that prospect certainly did not point toward adoption of more humane 
laws.23   
In any event, Field rose to meet the federalism challenge:   
That the government of the United States, through the action of 
the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is 
a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. 
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of 
every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it 
could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the 
control of another power.24   
By invoking the very concept of independent nationhood, Field is 
staking out an additional theoretical foundation for specific federal 
powers — one not confined to enumerated text. As Charles Black has 
elegantly argued in his classic work, Structure and Relationship in 
Constitutional Law, not all constitutional powers and restrictions must trace 
to a specific text. Certain structural features or premises of our basic charter 
can also provide a legitimate source of constitutional interpretation and 
reasoning.25  
At its base, the Constitution is a founding document that constitutes — 
establishes the framework for — governance of a nation. This nation was 
                                                                                                                 
 22. As documented in Lucy Salyer’s fine book on the Chinese experience with the 
immigration laws, Chae Chan Ping’s case was part of a broad litigation effort against anti-
Chinese legislation, financed and skillfully managed by the Chinese Six Companies, an 
umbrella community organization, which had scored several notable courtroom victories 
against hostile state and federal enactments in the late nineteenth century. LUCY SALYER, 
LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION 
LAW 40-41 and passim (1995); see also Chin, supra note 7, at 7, 9-10. 
 23. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL 
AMERICA 200-09 (1993) (describing the growing nativist resentment against Chinese in the 
late nineteenth century, accompanied by new legislative restrictions at the federal, state, and 
local levels). 
 24. 130 U.S. at 603-04 (emphasis added). 
 25. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
22-23, 67-98 (1969). 
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clearly intended to take its place in the global community of nations, 
possessed of all the powers implicit in the understanding of such an 
institution. As of 1787, the United States would be a nearly unique player in 
that league. The framers created a republic rather than a monarchy, and one 
with a written charter that intentionally sets out both governmental powers 
and individual rights, along with restrictions and specifications governing 
some of those powers. Nonetheless, the Constitution emphatically was 
written to establish a nation, not a mere association of persons seeking to 
achieve a limited range of contractual purposes. Asserting jurisdiction over 
a territory, which includes authority to choose which noncitizens to admit 
or exclude, is simply part of what it means to be a sovereign nation.26 This 
is the primary context in which Field deploys the concept of sovereignty.27 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (listing “a defined 
territory and a permanent population” as required characteristics of a state for international 
law purposes). 
 27. This same mode of reasoning dominates the Court’s decision in Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), which involved deportation of a Chinese national 
already in the United States, rather than exclusion at the border. The majority, in essence, 
saw Justice Field’s structural, sovereignty-based reasoning in Chae Chan Ping as fully 
applicable: “The right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or 
upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] . . . an inherent and inalienable right of every 
sovereign and independent nation . . . .” Id. at 711 (emphasis added).    
Intriguingly, Field dissented with exceptional vehemence in Fong Yue Ting, objecting in 
particular to the notion that the U.S. government “take[s] any power by any supposed 
inherent sovereignty.” 149 U.S. at 757. But at the same time, he expressed pride at being the 
author of the earlier decision. Id. at 746. The objection and the pride are at best in tension, if 
not in flat contradiction. See Cleveland, supra note 2, at 144-49 (offering thoughtful 
reflections on Field’s contradictory stances in the two cases). His dissent seeks to reconcile 
the difference by taking refuge in the argument that the U.S. Constitution has no 
extraterritorial application (a geographical designation which also renders it inapplicable to 
aliens at ports of entry), whereas it applies fully within our borders. 
Elsewhere, Field puts a somewhat different spin on the distinction, however, 
emphasizing the injustice of applying new restrictions to “persons lawfully domiciled therein 
by [the nation’s] consent.” 149 U.S. at 754-55 (Field, J., dissenting).  In modern terms, the 
latter distinction would essentially be that between lawful permanent residents (entitled to 
the strongest measure of procedural and substantive due process protection) and other aliens 
within the borders. The other two dissenters in Fong Yue Ting also placed emphasis on the 
unfairness of applying new restrictions so as to uproot persons who had taken up residence 
with governmental consent. Id. at 734-35 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 762-63 (Fuller, J., 
dissenting). I find the more functionalist distinction, based essentially on the legitimate 
expectations that spring from the nation’s consent to domicile, far more faithful than the 
geographic one to the premises of our overall constitutional scheme. See Martin, supra note 
3, at 214-215; see also David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional 
Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/4




Building on several earlier Supreme Court decisions from previous 
decades,28 Field goes on to explain why this sovereign authority cannot be a 
power exercised by the states:   
[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and 
their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers 
which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can 
be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and 
security throughout its entire territory. . . . “[T]he government 
which is alone capable of controlling and managing their 
interests in all these respects is the government of the Union. . . . 
It can, then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all 
individuals or governments within the American territory. . . .” 
. . . It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the 
country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other 
nations; all of which are forbidden to the state governments. It 
has jurisdiction over all those general subjects of legislation and 
sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people 
equally and alike, and which require uniformity of regulations 
and laws . . . .29 
Justice Field thus clearly claims the immigration control power for the 
federal government. At the same time, he generalizes further, in a way that 
helps solve a broader constitutional difficulty — namely, finding federal 
authority to engage in the full range of actions entailed in the conduct of 
foreign relations, rather than simply those rather skeletal specific actions 
adumbrated in the Constitution’s text, such as receiving foreign 
ambassadors. In fact, many writers have commented on the paucity of text 
to support the full range of actions actually undertaken in the conduct of 
diplomacy and foreign policy.30 
This requirement that the nation speak with one voice on the world stage 
(rather than thirty-eight different state voices, as would have been the case 
in 1889) has become a refrain importantly repeated in many later court 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875), Henderson v. Mayor of City of 
New York, 92 U.S. 259, 272 (1875), Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 
593-94 (1884). 
 29. 130 U.S. at 604-05 (quoting the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413-14 (1821)).  
 30. E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 79 (2d ed. 1996); 
Ramsey, supra note 19, at 437-38. 
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decisions with foreign-affairs implications, including the 2012 immigration 
decision in Arizona v. United States.31 Field invokes sovereignty in Chae 
Chan Ping, then, primarily to justify exclusive federal power to control 
immigration, despite the lack of an anchor in explicit constitutional text. 
Ironically, most of today’s critics of the 1889 decision, having the Arizona 
decision in mind, would probably endorse this part of the Court’s 
conclusions.  
B. Sovereignty Is Subject to Constitutional Limits  
Some commentators blame the invocation of sovereignty for a different 
feature of the opinion to which they strongly object — the Court’s refusal 
to engage in probing judicial review of the Chinese Exclusion Act or the 
executive action applying the exclusion rule to Chae Chan Ping.32 If the 
migration control authority is an extra-constitutional power deriving from 
sovereignty, the argument goes, then it follows that it is immune to 
constitutional constraints. But this critique misunderstands the reasoning at 
work in the opinion. Judicial deference to certain kinds of immigration 
actions, especially to congressional enactments, did not derive from the 
concept of sovereignty. It arose instead from the Court’s understanding of 
proper institutional roles, given the complex dynamics in the foreign affairs 
realm and the limited range of tools available to a government to affect 
behavior globally, as compared to the domestic arena.   
First, as a conceptual matter, there is no reason why sovereign powers, at 
least in a polity like the United States, necessarily escape constitutional 
constraints. Imposing the loss of liberty (or even life) based on conviction 
of a crime, for example, certainly amounts to the exercise of a sovereign 
power — justifiable because it is carried out only by those sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506-07 (2012); Crosby v. Nat’l. Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381-82 (2000); Japan Line Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 
U.S. 434, 449 (1979). 
 32. See Henkin, supra note 2, at 857-58; Hernández-Truyol, supra note 2, at 539-42; 
Saito, supra note 2, at 24. This concern also figures prominently in Justice Brewer’s dissent 
in Fong Yue Ting:  
It is said that the power here asserted is inherent in sovereignty. This doctrine 
of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous. Where 
are the limits to such powers to be found, and by whom are they to be 
pronounced? . . .  May the courts establish the boundaries? Whence do they 
obtain the authority for this? 
149 U.S. at 737. Brewer, a nephew of Justice Field, joined the Court a half year after Chae 
Chan Ping was decided. Owen M. Fiss, David J. Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in THE 
FIELDS AND THE LAW: ESSAYS 53-54 (Philip J. Bergan et al. eds., 1986). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/4
2015]      WHY THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE ENDURES 39 
 
 
institutions considered to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive 
force. Nonetheless, in our polity, criminal punishment remains subject to a 
host of constitutional restrictions that protect individual rights.  
Second, at a deeper level, subjecting sovereign powers to constitutional 
restrictions is thoroughly consistent with the innovative public philosophy 
developed during our nation’s founding in order to explain the new form of 
nation the framers were building. As explicated by Gordon Wood in his 
magisterial work The Creation of the American Republic,33 the founding 
generation pioneered a new philosophy of government wherein sovereignty 
belongs to the people, not to a monarch or some other governmental organ. 
In this new republic, governments — federal or state — exercise sovereign 
powers only by delegation from the people. The delegation comes subject 
to whatever conditions the sovereign people choose to impose. There is no 
conceptual reason why a power that is not expressly enumerated, but 
instead is structurally derived from the fact of nationhood, should be free of 
constitutional constraints equally stemming from the decision of the 
sovereign people. Nonetheless — and this is key to understanding Justice 
Field’s ultimate treatment — subjection to constitutional constraints vel non 
is a different issue from deciding precisely which institutions are properly 
involved in fulfilling a faithful discharge of the people’s bounded 
delegation.   
II. Foreign Affairs Linkage  
A. Foreign Affairs as the Central Reason for Judicial Deference in Chae 
Chan Ping 
Justice Field, of course, does wind up treating the political branch’s 
conclusions, in this particular setting, as conclusive on the judiciary — but 
he does not rest that outcome on the idea that immigration control is a 
sovereign power outside the reach of the Constitution. Instead, he offers a 
statement about institutional roles seen as appropriate for the respective 
branches of government in this specific domain. In the foreign arena, he 
writes, as a matter of “self-preservation,”34 the government has the “highest 
duty” to “preserve . . . independence, and give security against foreign 
aggression and encroachment.”35 To achieve these ends, the government 
                                                                                                                 
 33. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 344-
89 (1969).  
 34. 130 U.S. at 608. 
 35. Id. at 606.   
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is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the 
powers shall be called forth; and its determinations, so far as the 
subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon 
all its departments and officers. . . . The existence of war would 
render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and 
pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may 
arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which 
adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the 
other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the 
judiciary.36 
In other words, in 1888, the political branches judged necessary the 
application of a new absolute rule excluding Chinese laborers, in order to 
achieve security against what Congress deemed a type of foreign 
encroachment.37 Even with misgivings about the justice or fairness of the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). An earlier part of the opinion takes a similar approach in 
refusing to examine the congressional decision to breach the treaty with China when it 
passed the 1888 statute that led to Chae Chan Ping’s exclusion. After noting that there have 
been many occasions when a breach of treaty terms has been unquestionably appropriate 
(e.g., as part of our nation’s 1798 non-military conflict with revolutionary France), the 
opinion indicates that if the power rests with Congress, the Court is not to pass judgment 
upon Congress’s motives. Id. at 602. The Fong Yue Ting majority expresses the same view, 
suggesting that the substantive basis for invoking one of these protective powers amounts to 
a political question. 149 U.S. at 712.     
 37. It is hard for the modern observer to see Chinese migration in late nineteenth 
century as a form of deliberate “encroachment,” especially if this concept is meant to 
suggest insidious plots by the government of the source nation. Field’s characterization 
probably reflects more a reaction to scale. By some estimates, Chinese nationals constituted 
nearly one-eighth of California’s population as of 1880. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN 
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 16 
(2006) (noting that in 1880 California’s Chinese immigrant population equaled 105,000 out 
of the total 865,000 residents). This migration was largely drawn by the gold rush and its 
aftermath, which opened up high demand for cheap labor, especially in mining and railroad 
construction.  See TAKAKI, supra note 23, at 191-204. 
As of 2015, however, we unfortunately do have recent examples of insidious forms of 
deliberate encroachment in the guise of migration — Russia’s sending into Ukraine skilled 
soldiers who have stripped away identifying insignia, as well as convoys pretending to be 
humanitarian. See Alison Smale and Steven Erlanger, Ukraine Mobilizes Reserve Troops, 
Threatening War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/ 
europe/ukraine.html?_r=0; Sam Frizell, Russia Now Has 20,000 Troops on Ukraine Border, 
NATO Warns, TIME, Aug. 6, 2014, http://time.com/3085889/nato-russia-ukraine-troops-
buildup/; Reuters, Putin Calls for Talks on East Ukraine Statehood, But Not Independence, 
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 31, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/putin-calls-talks-east-
ukraine-statehood-not-independence-267778. This tactic achieved enough success in 
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action, the courts will not second-guess that judgment of necessity. In 
realms touching upon foreign relations and potential national self-
preservation, Field indicates, the nation must speak with one voice, and it is 
not for the courts to introduce a discordant sound.  
B. Complexity, Prophecy, and Experimentation in Foreign Affairs 
Decisionmaking 
Some critics of the plenary power doctrine question this asserted linkage 
between immigration and foreign affairs. Chinese exclusion was not a 
foreign affairs decision, they assert, but one driven by domestic political 
considerations — and in fact it worsened our relations with China.38 The 
invocation of foreign affairs is seen as a pretext covering up uglier motives, 
and the plenary power doctrine prevents courts from looking behind the 
mask.39 Therefore, some assert that courts should simply provide the 
ordinary measure of constitutional scrutiny — to smoke out invidious 
motives or at least to provide an appropriate evaluation of the weight of the 
governmental interest in light of the individual stake.40 
This kind of pretextual invocation certainly can occur. But here is the 
difficulty: We should not assume that pretexts in the foreign affairs arena 
                                                                                                                 
Ukraine that future variants may prove tempting, for Russia and for other expansionist 
powers. 
 38. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 12 (1st ed. 1985) (suggesting that the Chinese Exclusion Laws were passed 
despite foreign policy objectives, not because of them); Legomsky, Immigration Law and 
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 2, at 263 (suggesting that 
domestic political forces rather than international relations served as the primary impetus for 
the Chinese Exclusion Laws). 
 39. Hernández-Truyol, supra note 2, at 539-40; Legomsky, Immigration Law and the 
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 2, at 261; Saito, supra note 2, at 20. 
 40. It is far from clear, however, that this change in approach would have produced 
wins for the noncitizen claimants in the most frequently criticized cases, because the Court’s 
own constitutional doctrine at the specific time would often have accepted an imposition on 
individual rights that by today’s lights seems deeply objectionable. Jack Chin’s iconoclastic 
article on the plenary power doctrine has developed this argument quite effectively. Gabriel 
J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our 
Strange but Exceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000). 
Fong Yue Ting, for example, upheld an evidentiary rule allowing proof of prior residence 
only through the testimony of white witnesses. Such a rule would evoke the strictest scrutiny 
today, but that would hardly have been the likely outcome in 1893, three years before Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was decided. To take another example, by the time the 
Court was consistently applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications in the mid-1960s, 
Congress had acted to terminate the national-origins quota system. Chin, supra, at 261-64.  
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are readily identifiable. As Justice Breyer observed in a recent political 
question case:  
Decisionmaking in [the foreign affairs] area typically is highly 
political. It is “delicate” and “complex.” It often rests upon 
information readily available to the Executive Branch and to the 
intelligence committees of Congress, but not readily available to 
the courts. It frequently is highly dependent upon what Justice 
Jackson called “prophecy.” And the creation of wise foreign 
policy typically lies well beyond the experience or professional 
capacity of a judge. At the same time, where foreign affairs is at 
issue, the practical need for the United States to speak “with one 
voice and ac[t] as one,” is particularly important.41 
Many of the nation’s policy tools in the foreign arena are crude and 
imprecise, with uncertain impact. This very uncertainty may require trial-
and-error application, with a need for quick policy changes, especially in 
times of crisis. Therefore, deference to the political branches is called for, 
not because we can always be sure that their motives are pure and 
nondiscriminatory — we cannot — but because subjecting these measures 
to detailed litigation would interfere with the flexibility often necessary to 
act beyond our borders. A too-ready judicial interference would also impair 
our ability to deploy uncertain tools — deriving from immigration control, 
trade regulation, or other components of our international relations — 
according to a single unified strategy.42  
C. An Example: The Contrast to Domestic Measures 
Consider the seizure of U.S. diplomats by militants in Tehran in 1978. 
After the embassy invasion was ratified and defended by the new Iranian 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1437-38 (2012) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Jackson’s majority opinion in Chicago & S. Air Lines v. 
Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948), and Justice Frankfurter’s concurring 
opinion in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942)). 
 42. Justice Jackson captured some of this strategic consideration, coupled with the need 
for clear accountability in the face of the looming risk that particular courses of action on the 
global stage may prove unsuccessful, perhaps disastrously so, in the following passage from 
in his opinion in Chicago and Southern Air Lines, 333 U.S. at 111. Foreign policy decisions, 
he wrote, “are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people 
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary 
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the 
domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” 333 U.S. at 111 
(emphasis added). 
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government, the U.S. government turned to a disparate variety of 
countermeasures to try to win release of the American hostages, including 
the seizure of billions of dollars in assets of Iran and of its companies and 
nationals, litigation in the International Court of Justice, an ill-fated military 
rescue attempt after Iran defied the International Court, diplomatic 
overtures through Algeria, and certain immigration-law-based restrictions 
imposed on Iranian nationals in the United States.43 There were even 
proposals at the time to use immigration or other powers to intern large 
numbers of Iranian nationals so they could perhaps be part of an exchange 
that would bring the diplomats home.44 Thankfully, such internment was 
never put into motion.   
Contrast the trial-and-error use of these generally crude and scattershot 
measures with how the government would respond to a domestic 
kidnapping and potential hostage situation. The police could deploy quickly 
to investigate who seized the victims and where they were currently 
located. In that process the authorities could use judicial search warrants to 
facilitate the inquiry, plus arrest warrants and compulsory grand jury 
subpoenas as appropriate.  They could call on a wide range of assistance 
and technical support from a host of fully empowered domestic agencies, 
state and federal. Once the kidnappers were located, the police would 
establish perimeter control around the hostage site. No hostile militias 
would stand in the way (or if such appeared, other governmental power, 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law: Aliens, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 917, 920-21 (1980); Marian L. Nash, 
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Foreign Assets 
Control, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 418, 427-29 (1980); Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of 
the United States Relating to International Law: Termination of Relations, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 
657 (1980). The Attorney General imposed a special call-in requirement on Iranian 
postsecondary students to report to an  office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
or to a campus representative to present certain documentation and thus permit review of 
whether they remained in compliance with the conditions placed on their immigration status. 
The court of appeals sustained this action against constitutional challenge in Narenji v. 
Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979).    
 44. The celebrated foreign policy thinker George Kennan proposed interning Iranian 
nationals in the United States, though he focused on using a formal declaration of war, rather 
than relying upon statutory immigration authorities, to do so. See U.S. Security Interests and 
Policies in Southwest Asia: Hearings on U.S. Security Requirements in the Near East and 
South Asia Before the Subcomm. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the S. Comm. 
on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 87-123 (1980) (statement of Hon. George Kennan, Former 
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1. 
32754074685235;view=1up;seq=92; William F. Buckley, George Kennan’s Bomb, 32 
NATIONAL REVIEW 432 (1980).    
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including the National Guard, could be deployed). In a protracted standoff, 
judicially issued search warrants might help legitimate a forcible rescue 
operation. And the full weight of criminal punishment, imposed through 
efficiently functioning courts, could be expected for the kidnappers or 
hostage takers.  
This comparison helps reveal why courts are positioned to apply close 
constitutional scrutiny of official domestic action, whenever it is credibly 
challenged, but properly feel more constrained in the international arena.  In 
the international arena, U.S. actors generally cannot invoke compulsory 
process or other reliable coercive means under their own government’s 
control.  Moreover, the stakes are typically higher, as is the number of 
people potentially affected — not only by the immediate outcome but also 
by downstream effects, as the resolution either deters similar adverse 
actions in the future or instead stimulates them because the U.S. effort 
failed. With a domestic operation, judges can be confident that the 
government will still have plenty of capacity to deal with public safety 
threats, even in the presence of robust judicial review. One cannot have 
such confidence about the efficacy of alternative policy tools in the global 
arena if domestic judicial action begins to prevent or second-guess or slow 
down the use of those initially chosen by the political branches. 
Another difference between the two settings is relevant. In the domestic 
arena, we do not tolerate individuals using tit-for-tat responses to remedy 
wrongful behavior. I cannot justify seizing and carrying away my 
neighbor’s television on the ground that he borrowed my riding mower 
months ago and never returned it. But this prohibition on messy self-help 
obtains precisely because efficient hierarchical legal mechanisms, involving 
professional police and a developed court system, stand available to redress 
my neighbor’s wrongful act. In recent decades, the world has taken limited 
but hopeful steps toward investing transnational institutions with 
comparable powers, but progress remains quite uneven across different 
policy domains. The plenary power doctrine manifests the Supreme Court’s 
judgment that the kind of detailed constitutional scrutiny appropriate for the 
mature and developed domestic public order is not workable in the more 
primitive international legal system, marked primarily by horizontal action-
and-response to try to rectify breaches. 
D. The Nongovernmental Component of Foreign Affairs Decisionmaking 
Foreign affairs are involved in immigration decisionmaking for another, 
more entangling reason, even when there is no clear effort to retaliate 
against or to influence a foreign government. Most high-level immigration 
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decisions — by Congress or by the executive branch — are designed, at 
least in part, to influence or shape behavior overseas by individuals and 
nonstate actors, including both prospective immigrants (contemplating 
either legal or illegal channels) and smuggling organizations. For example, 
the decision (part of Operation Streamline45) to prosecute a high percentage 
of simple entrants without inspection caught along the southern border, 
causing them to spend some time in jail or prison before being repatriated, 
has been criticized as disproportionate to the inherent nature of this 
misdemeanor offense.46 But this critique misunderstands the policy 
decision. Operation Streamline is primarily meant to send a deterrent 
message to others contemplating a future clandestine crossing.47 The same 
is true of decisions to repatriate violators to a distant part of the land border 
rather than back to the border town from which they entered and where 
their coyote may be waiting to help them try again to enter.48 To take 
another example, in 1994, the Clinton administration decided to decouple 
the grant of work authorization from the simple act of filing for asylum, as 
had been provided under earlier regulations, though this change would 
mean that many applicants would be without a means of support, other than 
private or family charity, for as long as 180 days. This austere step was 
taken, in significant part, to discourage people planning to come to the 
United States to file an ill-founded claim that previously would have 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See Donald Kerwin & Kristen McCabe, Arrested on Entry: Operation Streamline and 
the Prosecution of Immigration Crimes, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 29, 2010), http:// www. 
migrationpolicy.org/article/arrested-entry-operation-streamline-and-prosecution-immgration-cr 
imes. 
 46. E.g., Joanna Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 
POL’Y BRIEF, Jan. 2010, at 7, available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_ 
Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
 47. See Successful Border Program Assures Consequences,  HOMELAND SECURITY 
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 2011, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/successful-border-progr 
am-ensures-consequences. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin 
explained the strategy imposing more severe consequences as a way to “[l]et the word go 
out” to potential future border crossers. Id.; see also Alan D. Bersin & Judith S. Feigin, The 
Rule of Law at the Border: Reinventing Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of 
California, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. REV. 285 (1998) (describing an earlier administration’s effort 
to use prosecution strategically). 
 48. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & 
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 932-41 (7th 
ed. 2012); LISA SEGHETTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42138, BORDER SECURITY: 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 7-12 (2014).   
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secured several years of residence and lawful work while they awaited a 
hearing.49   
Changes to the treatment or opportunities of noncitizens in the United 
States, whether in the direction of restriction or liberalization, almost 
inevitably affect the decisions of people and organizations abroad who are 
thinking about organizing or participating in migration to the United States. 
Smuggling organizations, in fact, often build their business plans around 
finding and exploiting weak spots in immigration laws or processes.50 As a 
result, some U.S. government measures take on a more severe or restrictive 
aspect than might initially seem to be warranted by the acts of the 
individuals most immediately affected. This is because the policymakers 
mean the action not just for those who are the direct object of enforcement 
on U.S. soil but also for the message sent to others they want to deter. This 
dynamic appears to explain, in significant part, the Obama administration’s 
decisions to respond to the southwest border migration surge in summer of 
2014 with a surprisingly severe set of measures, including sustained 
detention, even though the subjects were mainly children traveling with a 
mother or other relative. The executive branch also implemented 
accelerated removal processing where the law permitted such action, and 
assured substantial publicity for the flight whenever recent migrants were 
deported by airplane to their home country.51 Despite sharp criticism, these 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
725 (1995).  
 50. Peter Andreas, The Transformation of Migrant Smuggling Across the U.S.-Mexico 
Border, in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 107-22 (David Kyle & 
Rey Koslowski eds., 2001). 
 51. See Julia Preston, Detention Center Presented as Deterrent to Border Crossings, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/us/homeland-security-chief-opens-
largest-immigration-detention-center-in-us.html; Julia Preston, In Remote Detention Center, a 
Battle on Fast Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2014, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/09/06/us/in-remote-detention-center-a-battle-on-fast-deportations.html; M.S.P.C. v. 
Johnson, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Jan. 30, 2015, https://www.aclu.org/ immigrants-
rights/mspc-v-johnson (fact sheet on pending litigation). In his November 20, 2014, speech 
announcing what was otherwise a wide range of liberalizing immigration measures taken on 
the unilateral authority of the executive branch, President Obama somewhat 
uncharacteristically emphasized his administration’s successful efforts to stem this flow, as a 
sign of his commitment to rigorous border control in the future. See Press Release, The White 
House, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-addre 
ss-nation-immigration. I present a more complete analysis of the administration’s reaction to 
the 2014 migrant surge in David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for 
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practices persisted, and they seem to have had much of the desired deterrent 
impact in the foreign nations at issue. In fact, monthly arrivals of 
unaccompanied minors from these countries declined from 10,631 in June 
2014 to 2,432 in September.52 
This kind of deterrence-based action, focused on overseas individuals 
and nongovernmental players, is also an aspect of foreign affairs, even 
though it falls below the plane of high-level geopolitics. It likewise may 
need to take the form of rough-hewn trial-and-error, like the more 
traditional foreign-relations actions directed at governments.  The Supreme 
Court’s case law over the years appears to consider such policy choices 
equally worthy of foreign-affairs deference.53   
This  analysis is not meant as advocacy for the quick or expansive use of 
immigration restrictions to respond to objectionable or unwelcome actions 
of foreign governments or nonstate actors. For reasons of both policy and 
proportion, immigration sanctions of this type should be sparingly 
deployed. But the Court’s doctrine of deference in Chae Chan Ping and 
later cases is based on the recognition that even for relatively liberal 
foreign-affairs decisionmakers, rough-hewn actions that initially seem 
outsized or individually unfair might need to be in the mix to respond to, or 
to help shape, actions that others are taking abroad.54     
                                                                                                                 
Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J. L. & 
POLITICS 411, 418-24 (2015). 
 52. See U.S. BORDER PATROL, TOTAL MONTHLY UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN 
APPREHENSIONS BY MONTH, BY SECTOR (FY 2010 – FY 2014), Dec. 19, 2014, http:// 
www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Total%20Monthly%20UACs%20by%20
Sector%2C%20FY10.-FY14.pdf (indicating that the monthly flow averaged approximately 
2,000 in FY 2012 and approximately 3,200 in FY 2013; the flow rose sharply in 2014, 
ultimately exceeding 10,000 arrivals in May and June before falling below 2,500 in 
September as a result of the executive branch’s policy responses).   
 53. E.g., I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 187-88 (1993). 
 54. President Clinton’s decision to continue across-the-board interdiction of Haitian 
migrants when he assumed office, even though he had sharply criticized this policy during his 
campaign, provides an illustration. See DAVID A. MARTIN, THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, & MARYELLEN FULLERTON, FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY 775-
90 (2d ed. 2013). The Supreme Court approved his action on an eight-to-one vote, despite 
expressing policy concerns about the harshness of this outcome. Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 159, 179 (1993). But for Clinton this was not the end of the story. 
Uneasiness about the continuation of interdiction, despite the Court’s affirmance of its legality, 
contributed to the President’s ultimate decision to use military deployments, under UN Security 
Council authority, to oust the Haitian generals and restore the democratically elected president, 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  MARTIN, et al., supra, at 775-90. For reflections both on the Clinton 
experience in Haiti and more generally on the occasional need for rough-hewn policy measures 
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III. Why the Court Resists Even Moderate 
Proposals for a More Active Judicial Role 
A more nuanced branch of the Chae Chan Ping criticism accepts that 
foreign affairs considerations may well be at stake in some immigration 
decisions, but would modify the doctrine to allow for a carefully structured 
closer judicial look.55 The courts, such observers contend, should not take 
political branch assertions as controlling, but instead should perform an 
initial judicial probe of the asserted reasons, to decide whether the 
challenged immigration restriction rests on a significant foreign affairs 
foundation. If the answer is yes, then the reviewing court should treat the 
political branches’ decision as dispositive — essentially, as a political 
question not subject to judicial review.  But if not, then the court should 
apply ordinary modes of constitutional review, which might well bring a 
form of heightened scrutiny.    
At first glance, this kind of proposal would seem to offer an attractive 
middle ground to the Supreme Court. Yet the Court in practice has 
manifested great resistance to these scholarly invitations. Why? In my view, 
a majority of the Justices harbor a deep skepticism that lower courts can be 
trusted to give sufficient weight to foreign policy concerns in making any 
such threshold assessment. The very nature of immigration litigation in the 
courts of appeals, with an actual and often sympathetic human being front 
and center, makes a reviewing judge far more likely to overvalue the 
individual interests at stake and undervalue the more subtle and complex 
reasons why a particular measure may be needed for system stability or to 
influence behavior beyond our borders — connections that often would not 
become fully apparent until broader damage is manifested months or years 
after an interventionist judicial decision.56 
                                                                                                                 
with regard to immigration, see David A. Martin, Interdiction of Asylum Seekers: The Realms 
of Policy and Law in Refugee Protection, in YALE LAW SCHOOL SALE SYMPOSIUM (2014), 
OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 15, 2014),  http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/15/yls-sale-symposium-interdic 
tion-asylum-seekers-realms-policy-law-refugee-protection/. 
 55. Stephen Legomsky led the way to developing and defending this thoughtful 
proposal. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 
supra note 2, at 255, 262-63. 
 56. A revealing example, involving the interplay between the district court and the court 
of appeals, is provided by litigation involving Hany Kiareldeen. The district court found due 
process violations in the government’s use of secret evidence to keep Kiareldeen in 
detention pending final resolution of his deportation case. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 
2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999). The government maintained that he was linked to terrorist 
organizations. Id. at 404. Eventually the government yielded to the district court’s demands, 
dropped its appeal of the initial merits ruling, released Kiareldeen, and ceased its efforts to 
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Anna Law’s book, The Immigration Battle in American Courts, 
documents this disparity in outlook between the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts quite revealingly. She describes “how [lower court] judges can 
disregard congressional edicts limiting their scope of review in order to 
reach a desired result,”57 and can usually get away with it because the 
Supreme Court can review only a tiny fraction of their decisions.58 
Professor Law regards this stance by the courts of appeals as a virtue, but 
the Supreme Court doubtless views it otherwise. Keeping the plenary power 
doctrine categorical gives the Supreme Court greater assurance that lower 
courts will preserve the space needed for government actions to meet real 
foreign affairs imperatives (even if this stance inevitably also leaves room 
for some ill-motivated actions adopted by the political branches).  
If this symposium were being held at the time of Chae Chan Ping’s 
centennial, in 1989, we might have had greater reason to expect some 
softening by the Supreme Court regarding the deference doctrine in the 
foreign affairs arena.  Exactly twenty-five years before the week when this 
symposium convened in Norman, Oklahoma, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling 
that the Soviet bloc was coming apart, about to be replaced, in many 
instances, by democratic governments. Lengthy wars were ending in Latin 
America, and dictators were being forced from office. It appeared we were 
on the cusp of a far more benign world order — one that might permit the 
rapid flowering of more protective international legal institutions and 
thereby reduce reliance on crude action-and-response in the international 
arena.   
Today’s global scene is far more grim. Not only has the United States 
experienced the trauma of al Qaeda’s September 11 attacks, which revealed 
a genuine need for more vigilant immigration screening, but democratic 
nations are also facing new global threats from other nongovernmental 
actors who actually glorify the use of beheadings, crucifixion, and slavery, 
in addition to other players using more old-fashioned forms of terrorism 
directed at civilians. Failed states are more common, and well-armed 
                                                                                                                 
deport him. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 92 F. Supp. 2d 403, 404-05 (D.N.J. 2000). The district court 
then awarded attorney’s fees to Kiareldeen, finding that the government’s position was not 
substantially justified. Id. at 409. The government appealed that award. Kiareldeen v. 
Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit wound up ruling on that ancillary 
appeal after the 9/11 terror attacks. Partially in light of the 9/11 experience, the higher court 
reversed the award, leveling harsh criticism at the district court’s initial rulings, essentially 
for being naïve about the need for secrecy to protect intelligence sources and about the range 
of necessary government responses to terrorism. Id. at 555-57.  
 57. ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 139 (2010). 
 58. See id. at 126-43, 231-36. 
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insurgencies have proliferated. The march of democracy has slowed and, in 
several countries, reversed. Climate change and even plague-like diseases 
presage more complicated foreign policy challenges, many of which will 
have a migration dimension. The risks to the United States, if our 
government’s foreign-policy-linked initiatives are unsuccessful, now seem 
far higher than in 1989. Thus, I do not foresee the Supreme Court retreating 
significantly from the strong deference doctrines derived from Chae Chan 
Ping.59  
IV. The Continuing Relevance of Judicial 
Review and of Constitutional Values  
The foregoing conclusions about the plenary power doctrine’s 
persistence should not be taken as a counsel of despair. To start with, let us 
be candid about the significant court role left open even after Chae Chan 
Ping. I have spent six years as a government lawyer dealing with 
immigration matters, in three different administrations over the course of 
thirty-five years. The picture from inside government is not at all one of 
agencies taking comfort in a bullet-proof shelter fortified by the plenary 
power doctrine and upholstered with judicial deference. The opposite 
feeling more often prevails. Courts review thousands of immigration cases 
                                                                                                                 
 59. If the twenty-first-century Court were ready to make inroads into the plenary power 
doctrine, this year’s Kerry v. Din case, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), presented a golden 
opportunity, because a sympathetic petitioner there asked for what appeared to be a quite 
modest judicial intervention. Nonetheless the majority rejected the claim. Id. at 2138. Din is 
a U.S. citizen who had petitioned for the immigration of her husband, an Afghan national. 
The consular officer denied an immigrant visa, and the only reason given to Din was a 
citation to the broad terrorism ground of inadmissibility. She argued that the due process 
clause’s protection of marital rights mandates in these circumstances a more complete 
statement of reasons so that she might have a meaningful opportunity to seek 
reconsideration. Id. at 2131. The four dissenters would have ruled in her favor, id. at 2141 
(Breyer, J., dissenting), while the other five Justices combined to reject the claim. Justice 
Scalia, for the three-member plurality, held that the due process clause does not apply 
because the government’s action denied Din no constitutionally recognized liberty interest. 
Id. at 2138. Of more relevance here, however, was the opinion by Justice Kennedy for 
himself and Justice Alito. Id. at 2139. They assumed without deciding that a liberty interest 
was involved, but they relied on the exceedingly deferential test announced in the First 
Amendment case of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), to hold that Din received 
all the process she was due. Id. at 2139-41. That test requires a court to uphold a visa denial 
if it is based on a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770 
(emphasis added). Kennedy specifically relied on Congress’s plenary power over conditions 
of admission in finding that the bare-bones reason given to Din was facially legitimate. Din, 
135 S. Ct. at 2139-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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each year.60 Chae Chan Ping imposes no barrier to challenges alleging that 
administrative action departed from legal requirements based in statute or 
regulation. And, in deportation cases, procedural due process review can be 
demanding and significant. The government loses a significant percentage 
of these cases.61 This give-and-take between the branches provides valuable 
checks and balances, particularly on administrative action.   
Nonetheless, whatever the perception within the administrative agencies, 
aren’t advocates still foreclosed by the plenary power doctrine from 
bringing immigration statutes into compliance with modern understandings 
of the Constitution? No, for two important reasons. First, although 
immigration statutes officially are not subject to constitutional review and 
invalidation under the usual understanding of Chae Chan Ping  and Fong 
Yue Ting, statutory interpretation and application certainly remain part of 
judicial duty. In this endeavor, courts frequently employ the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to implement interpretations that adhere more 
closely to constitutional values than what Congress may have intended.62  
This way of bending measures toward constitutional harmony is not a 
new departure for courts. As Lucy Salyer has documented, before the dawn 
of the twentieth century the lower federal courts in California countered or 
buffered the first decades of anti-Chinese agitation. They issued many 
courageous rulings reading state and federal statutes narrowly so as to 
minimize intrusions on the rights or interests of the targeted foreigners.63 
Circuit Judge Lorenzo Sawyer, who decided the Chae Chan Ping case at 
the trial level, had participated extensively in that protective judicial 
                                                                                                                 
 60. For fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the U.S. Courts of Appeals received an average 
of nearly 7000 cases annually seeking review of decisions by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA). U.S. COURTS, TABLE B-3—U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL BUSINESS 1 
(2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/app 
endices/B03Sep13.pdf. These statistics do not include other immigration cases that reach the 
federal courts, such as challenges to detention and various petitions for injunctive relief, 
which are typically filed in the district courts. 
 61. For example, BIA decisions were reversed by the federal courts of appeals at a rate 
of 15.9% in calendar year 2014. John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for 
December 2014 and Calendar Year 2014 Totals, IMMIGRATION L. ADVISOR, Jan. 2015, at 5, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/02/26/vol 
9no1final.pdf. Because only the noncitizen may petition the courts for review of a BIA 
decision, each of those reversals represents a loss for the government.  
 62. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001); Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 
U.S. 276, 284 (1966). The classic treatment of this phenomenon is Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2.    
 63. SALYER, supra note 22, at 12-13, 18-21. 
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process. In his ruling on Chae Chan Ping’s petition he noted, somewhat 
ruefully, that he could not achieve a more equitable result this time, owing 
to the clarity of the statute and Congress’s (by then) clear intention to 
violate the treaties with China. He explained: 
We have, heretofore, found it our duty, however unpleasant, at 
times, to maintain, fearlessly, and steadily, the rights of Chinese 
laborers under our treaties with China, and the acts of congress 
passed to carry them out. That we have been right in law, is 
established by the fact that our decisions have been affirmed by 
the supreme court of the United States on every point of law and 
construction of the act that has been raised, or discussed before 
us . . . .  As we faithfully enforced the laws, as we found them, 
when they were in favor of the Chinese laborers, we deem it, 
equally, our duty to enforce them in all their parts, now that they 
are unfavorable to them. . . . [We also] deem it proper to express 
the hope, that, so long as we sit upon the judgment seat, we shall 
be endowed with sufficient courage and firmness to administer 
honestly, and faithfully, according to its true import, any valid 
law . . . .  [But it] is not the function of the courts to abrogate an 
unsatisfactory law by arbitrarily refusing to enforce it. The only 
proper mode of getting rid of such a law, is, for congress to 
repeal or modify it.64 
Judge Sawyer’s closing observation calls attention to a second avenue 
for achieving just and constitutional outcomes, one that is more often 
overlooked. Courts are not the only venues where one may defend 
constitutional values against objectionable statutes. The Chinese Exclusion 
Laws disappeared from our code not because a court issued a decree, but 
because Congress finally saw fit to repeal them in 1943.65  The national 
origins quota system ended in 1965 not because the Warren Court struck 
them down but because decades of advocacy won that significant victory on 
Capitol Hill.66  
                                                                                                                 
 64. In re Chae Chan Ping, 36 F. 431, 436-37 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1888), aff'd sub nom. Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 65. Magnuson Act, Pub. L. No. 78-199, § 1, 57 Stat. 600 (1943). 
 66. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911, 911-12 (1965). For rich 
accounts, see DANIEL TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL 
IN AMERICA 211-16 (2002); ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY 
IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 324-33 (2006). 
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Justice Field may have had in mind something like this nonjudicial 
process for defending constitutional values when he penned what otherwise 
seems a puzzling passage in Chae Chan Ping, given that the opinion’s main 
message is that courts will not entertain a constitutional challenge to 
exclusion. After describing and listing foreign-affairs-related powers 
(which also include declaring war, making treaties, repelling invasions, and 
accepting new citizens), Field adds these words: “[These] are all sovereign 
powers, restricted in their exercise only by the constitution itself and 
considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the 
conduct of all civilized nations.”67 Other branches, he suggests, are 
primarily responsible for applying the constitutional restrictions and for 
making any trade-offs between policy and justice; as a result there will 
come times when constitutional principles are honored less, rather than 
more. (Perhaps we can even find in Field’s careful words a hint that he 
regards the particular treatment of Chae Chan Ping as unjust.) The 
assignment of institutional roles for the various branches of government, in 
other words, may make for imperfect realization — and perhaps sometimes 
for actions out of harmony with constitutional values, properly understood. 
But — and this is critical — Field does not see these decisions as somehow 
beyond constitutional restriction and certainly not beyond considerations of 
public policy and justice.  
In his discussion of Chae Chan Ping’s treaty claim, Field gives a further 
glimpse of his ideas about how the influence of the Constitution and just 
public policy might be brought to bear, even in the absence of judicial 
intervention.  Speaking of various foreign affairs authorities, including the 
war power, Field observes: 
This court is not a censor of the morals of other departments of 
the government; it is not invested with any authority to pass 
judgment upon the motives of their conduct. . . . We do not mean 
to intimate that the moral aspects of legislative acts may not be 
proper subjects of consideration. Undoubtedly they may be, at 
proper times and places, before the public, in the halls of 
congress, and in all the modes by which the public mind can be 
influenced. Public opinion thus enlightened, brought to bear 
upon legislation, will do more than all other causes to prevent 
abuses . . . .68 
                                                                                                                 
 67. 130 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added).   
 68. Id. at 602-03.    
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Field illustrates these modes of influence and enlightenment by referring 
to the nation’s earlier disputes over the 1846 war against Mexico. There 
“the propriety and wisdom and justice of [the government’s] action were 
vehemently assailed by some of the ablest and best men in the country.”69 
This line probably refers, at least in part, to Abraham Lincoln, who assailed 
the Mexican war in 1848 as a young congressman, calling it “unnecessarily 
and unconstitutionally commenced.”70 That constitutional argument 
occurred not in the courtroom, but in the halls of Congress. 
The half-century struggle against the 1921 national origins quota 
system71 affords an instructive modern illustration of the phenomenon to 
which Field made reference. When Congress passed the Immigration and 
Nationality Act in 1952, President Harry Truman vetoed the bill. His veto 
message details many flaws in the lengthy statute, but focuses primarily on 
the national origins quota system, which Congress had chosen to perpetuate 
with only minor changes. Truman’s message repeatedly emphasizes that 
such quotas amount to “invidious discrimination,” based on discredited 
social theories “at variance with our American ideals”72 — clearly invoking 
constitutional values. When Congress overrode his veto, Truman appointed 
a blue-ribbon commission to critique existing immigration laws and 
propose changes. That commission continued the harsh criticism of the 
national origins quotas, considering that they (and certain other provisions 
of the Act) “flout fundamental American traditions and ideals.”73 Although 
the courts continued into the 1960s to sustain against constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 629.  
 70. Representative Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Mexican War, Speech to Congress 
(Jan. 12, 1848), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mal:@field 
(DOCID+@lit(d0007400))#I31; see 30 CONG. GLOBE 145, 154-156 (1848) (recording the 
congressional account of Mr. Lincoln’s speech). Lincoln was the President who appointed 
Stephen Field to the Court, over twenty-five years before the Chae Chan Ping case arose. 
See Biographies of the Robes: Stephen Johnson Field, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ 
supremecourt/personality/robes_field.html (last visited June 15, 2015). 
 71. Emergency Quota Act, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5, 5-7 (1921); TICHENOR, 
supra note 66, at 138-43; ZOLBERG, supra note 66, at 251-54. 
 72. Harry S. Truman, Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, 
Naturalization, and Nationality, PUB. PAPERS 441 (June 25, 1952); see also TICHENOR, supra 
note 66, at 188-99, 211-18 (describing the battles over the national origins quotas in the 
1952 Act, the veto, and the aftermath, including success in repealing the quotas in 1965). 
 73. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL 
WELCOME xv (1953). For the Commission’s full analysis of and objections to the national 
origins quotas, see id. at 83-109. 
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challenge even the most racially discriminatory quota provisions,74 a wide 
range of advocates and members of Congress kept up the fight against the 
quotas, and the struggle finally achieved repeal in 1965.75 A similar effort, 
invoking First Amendment values, was directed toward the ideological 
exclusion provisions,76 which had been subjected to the most minimal 
judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel in 1972.77  
This effort won success with the major revision of the exclusion provisions 
in 1990.78  
V. Conclusion 
Chae Chan Ping should not be taken as a reason to vent anger over 
judicial timidity.  Instead, it stands as a call to roll up our sleeves and get to 
work in the political arena rather than the courts. Accepting that implicit 
challenge, we should do more toward training our students in disciplined 
policy analysis and broader legislative and regulatory advocacy skills. We 
should encourage more of them, and more of our scholarly colleagues, to 
take up positions in the immigration agencies and on Capitol Hill.  
Taken seriously, that type of engagement will also reveal that turning 
constitutional values into precise and workable changes in the immigration 
field is far from an easy or automatic process. Subtle but important reasons 
for tempering beneficence with prudence are more likely to become 
apparent in the arena of politics and governance than in the judicial arena. 
Having to deal with tradeoffs and complex objectives, as part of a team that 
bears long-term and continuing responsibility for outcomes, can be 
educational, in the best sense of the term. The political path to reform is of 
course more uncertain, more diffuse, and less precise than a clean 
constitutional victory would be in the Supreme Court. The former method 
will take longer, and it will doubtless produce many disappointments and 
                                                                                                                 
 74. E.g., Hitai v. INS, 343 F.2d 466 F.3d (2d Cir. 1965) (sustaining statutory provisions 
that attributed descendants of Japanese to the highly restricted Japan quota, even though they 
were natives and citizens of Brazil).   
 75. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2(a), 79 Stat. 911, 911-912 (1965). 
 76. See, e.g., Scanlan supra note 2; Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing 
the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930 (1987); Alexander Wohl, Free 
Speech and the Right of Entry into the United States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological 
Exclusion Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 
443 (1989). 
 77. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).  
 78. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, replacing 
inter alia, Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(28), 66 Stat. 163 
(1952)). 
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disputes along the way. But that path has at times produced truly important 
results.    
In Choruses from The Rock, T.S. Eliot writes disparagingly of those who 
“dream[] of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.”79 The 
relentless critique of the plenary power doctrine, with its exaggerated 
expectations about how judges deploying constitutional law can cure bad 
policy and injustice — in the midst of an uncertain, complex, and 
dangerous world — partakes of that sort of dream. We need instead to 
shoulder the hard responsibility of struggling, collectively, to discern what 
is good, and then working to achieve a realistic measure of that vision 
through the political process. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 79. T.S. Eliot, Choruses from the Rock, in COLLECTED POEMS, 1909-1962, at 160 
(1963). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss1/4
